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CONTEMPORARY LESSONS FROM THE AGE-OLD PRIZE CASES: 
A COMMENT ON THE CIVIL WAR IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW 
DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Lee’s work on the history of the Supreme Court’s Civil War-era 
Prize Cases raises a question that could not be timelier for modern 
constitutional and international law scholars: What significance do these iconic 
cases have for contemporary foreign affairs law in the United States?1  On first 
blush, one might be forgiven for imagining the answer is: not much.  After all, 
the past four years alone have seen the Supreme Court produce at least four 
landmark cases elaborating on the scope of executive power under 
constitutional and international law.2  The Prize Cases were cited by the 
majority in only one of the four, and there solely for the purpose of rejecting 
the dissent’s suggestion that the Prize Cases were at all germane.3 
Yet since 2001, the Prize Cases had appeared repeatedly in claims by the 
U.S. Department of Justice of broad executive power over matters of national 
security and foreign affairs.  The cases appeared in memos to support the 
President’s inherent authority to engage in coercive interrogation of terrorist 
 
* Visiting Scholar, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Law, Princeton University.  This comment is based on a lecture delivered on March 
7, 2008, at the Saint Louis University School of Law Symposium on The Use and Misuse of 
History in U.S. Foreign Relations Law. 
 1. Thomas H. Lee, The Civil War in U.S. Foreign Relations Law: A Dress Rehearsal for 
Modern Transformations, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53 (2008) (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 
Black) 635 (1863)). 
 2. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004).  These are only the most well known foreign and international law opinions the Court has 
issued.  Others may prove at least as significant over time in defining executive power and the 
role of international law in U.S. courts.  See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2207 
(2008); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 3. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 599 n.31 (addressing the Prize Cases’ narrow holding regarding 
the Executive’s power to recognize the existence of war) (“Because we do not question the 
Government’s position that the war commenced with the events of September 11, 2001, the Prize 
Cases are not germane to the analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
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suspects.4  They were invoked to defend the President’s authority to conduct 
warrantless surveillance beyond the powers described in the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, the law that had provided the “exclusive means” 
by which the Executive could engage in intelligence surveillance in the United 
States.5  And they were deployed to support the claim that the President has 
inherent authority to detain as an “enemy combatant” a U.S. citizen arrested in 
Chicago and suspected of terrorist activity.6  In each instance, the Prize Cases 
were invoked to support the argument that all of these prerogatives were within 
the President’s powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  Do the cases 
withstand such reliance? 
Professor Lee would seem to agree that the Prize Cases are indeed 
significant, but not for the reasons these executive claims would suggest.  
Among other features of their precedential impact, he suggests, the Prize Cases 
offer support not necessarily for an expansive reading of Article II, but for the 
proposition that “international law provides a basis for the President’s exercise 
of military force in a manner neither specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution nor preauthorized by congressional enactments.”7  In this respect, 
they might do little to support recent claims of inherent executive power under 
the Constitution.  But they might have much to say about, for example, 
whether a U.N. Security Council resolution could empower an executive to 
take counterterrorism measures not otherwise authorized by Article II alone.8 
 
 4. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002), in 
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 206 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. 
Dratel eds., 2005) (citing Prize Cases in support of the President’s “complete discretion in 
exercising the Commander-in-Chief power”); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant 
U.S. Att’y Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S Dep’t of Def., at 5 & n.7, 6 (Mar. 14, 
2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf (“If the 
President is confronted with an unforeseen attack on the territory and people of the United States, 
or other immediate, dangerous threat to American interests and security, it is his constitutional 
responsibility to respond to that threat with whatever means are necessary.”). 
 5. Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the 
Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President, at 7–9 (Jan. 19, 2006) 
(citing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1812, 1821–1829, 
1841–1846, 1861–1862, 1871, 1881, 1885 (2000)), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ 
whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf. 
 6. Brief for the Petitioner at 35, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027) 
(“[I]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but 
bound to resist by force.  He . . . is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special 
legislative authority.” (quoting Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668)). 
 7. Lee, supra note 1, at 55 (emphasis added). 
 8. For a detailed account of the global growth of just such an effect on the power of 
domestic executives, see Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas: The 
Post-9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 347 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). 
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A conclusion that the Prize Cases could support such a notion would be 
dramatic indeed, making it possible for any administration to supplement the 
limited powers the Framers intended to provide the President under the 
Constitution with affirmative powers in a source of law external to the nation’s 
constitutive charter.  But as I shall argue below, it would seem surprising at the 
least if the Prize Cases Court worked such a profound change in constitutional 
law without saying so directly.  Indeed, I believe such a proposition cannot 
fairly be found in the Court’s opinion. 
What does remain of great significance in the Prize Cases, however, is the 
insight they offer into the Court’s relative interest in deferring to the Executive 
on the interpretation of law, even in times of armed conflict.  On that topic, and 
contrary to Professor Lee’s suggestion, I believe the Prize Cases are better 
recognized for their identification of the limits of judicial deference in 
wartime—limits that make the Court’s most recent cases in the field only the 
latest in a lengthening line of precedents embracing judicial competence in key 
matters of national security. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL LAW SOURCES OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
Professor Lee’s contention that international law may support the 
President’s use of military force not expressly authorized by the U.S. 
Constitution or laws is based on his reading of the Prize Cases and the 
circumstances surrounding the Court’s decision.  Among the questions 
presented in those cases was whether President Lincoln acted within his 
authority in erecting a naval blockade of seceded southern states shortly after 
Confederate forces fired on the federal military installation at Fort Sumter, 
South Carolina.9  According to Professor Lee, international law of the day was 
clear in permitting such blockades (pursuant to certain limitations), provided 
there existed a state of war between belligerents.10  At the same time, Professor 
Lee posits, the President’s authority to erect the blockade was far less apparent 
under domestic law.  Unlike the President’s presumptive constitutional power 
to engage in defensive force without prior authorization, a blockade of this 
nature could only be understood as an offensive act (inasmuch as it infringed 
the rights of neutral trading partners and citizens who were not a part of the 
Confederacy).11  Offensive acts of war could only be authorized by Congress.  
Yet Congress had not authorized any such action; indeed, it was in recess at the 
time the blockade proclamations issued.12  Thus, Professor Lee reasons, 
 
 9. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 665. 
 10. Lee, supra note 1, at 59. 
 11. Id. at 63–64. 
 12. Id. at 57. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
76 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:73 
President Lincoln’s power to pursue the blockade must have come, if 
anywhere, from international law itself.13 
One might well challenge more than one step in this chain of reasoning 
(the claim, for instance, that no existing federal statute would have authorized 
Lincoln’s action).14  But its greatest import is in the assertion that Lincoln’s 
power under the circumstances should be understood as flowing from a source 
other than the Constitution and laws of the United States.  After all, it is most 
typically considered black letter law that ours is a government of limited 
powers, a principle found (among other places) in the Constitution’s Tenth 
Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”15  Indeed, in the years since the Prize Cases, 
and without much pausing on their account, the Supreme Court has affirmed 
more than once that the power of the President “must stem either from an act 
of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”16 
Perhaps conscious of this concern, Professor Lee’s opening claim that 
“international law provides a basis for the President’s exercise of military 
force” in erecting the blockade is later restated more equivocally as the 
proposition that international law in the Prize Cases “defined and enhanced the 
scope of presidential war power.”17  But there seems quite some distance 
between the position that international law creates the power, and the rather 
narrower claim that international law helps define powers otherwise granted.  
The latter claim, which I have taken Professor Wuerth, among others, to 
embrace, flows without much difficulty from common problems of 
constitutional interpretation.  Thus, for example, where textual and originalist 
 
 13. Id. at 59–64.  The text of the blockade proclamation invoked both domestic and 
international law, ordering “a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of 
the laws of the United States and of the law of nations in such case provided.”  Proclamation No. 
4, 12 Stat. app. 1258, 1259 (Apr. 19, 1861). 
 14. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149 
(2004); see also infra pp. 77–79. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1221, 1247–48 (1995). 
 16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952); see also 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (“Even when the United States 
acts outside its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such 
restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.’” (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 
(1885))); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“I take it to be correct . . . that the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, 
whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.”); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) 
(“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its power and authority have no 
other source.  It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”). 
 17. Lee, supra note 1, at 55, 61 (emphasis added). 
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interpretative methods fail to resolve a question of constitutional foreign affairs 
power, the conduct of the other branches of government may help inform 
judicial construction of constitutional provisions.18  A treaty or executive 
agreement may shed light on one or both of the political branches’ presumptive 
views of their own power, and courts may be aided by taking those views into 
account.19 
In contrast, the suggestion that international law may serve, ex proprio 
vigore, as a font of federal power is precisely the outcome the Court self-
consciously worked to avoid in the landmark Missouri v. Holland, upholding 
the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act restricting the hunting of certain 
migratory birds.20  There, the Court was called to consider whether the United 
States had the authority to enter into, and enforce against the states, a treaty 
that regulated a topic the Court had already held was beyond Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power to regulate.21  Often framed as presenting the 
question whether a treaty could empower Congress to take action that the 
Constitution otherwise did not,22 Holland skirted the invitation to hold the 
Migratory Bird Treaty itself an independent font of power and instead located 
affirmative authority for congressional regulation of migratory birds in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I: 
If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute 
under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the 
powers of the Government. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be 
found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some 
invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.23 
Finding no basis for Missouri’s claim that the power to regulate migratory 
birds was reserved exclusively to the states, the Court concluded that the 
federal law enforcing the treaty commitment was within Congress’s Article I 
power—as it may be inferred Congress itself had concluded in its own exercise 
in constitutional interpretation undertaken before enacting the legislation.24  
 
 18. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The 
Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 64–65 (2007) (describing 
international law as a useful “second-order interpretive norm”). 
 19. See id. at 63–65 & nn.10–17. 
 20. 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). 
 21. Id. at 431–32. 
 22. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1867 (2005). 
 23. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432–34. 
 24. Id. at 432. 
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The Treaty did not create Congress’s power to pass laws “carrying into 
Execution” the treaties of the United States, but its ratification gave substantive 
content to that power’s scope.25 
Under the circumstances, had it been the intention of the Prize Cases Court 
to recognize that international law may provide an independent font of 
structural federal authority, one might at a minimum expect to find some 
detailed defense of that view in the Court’s decision.  But on the contrary, the 
opinion itself, while hardly a model of clarity, more readily suggests just the 
opposite conclusion.  Namely, that the President’s proclaimed blockade was an 
exercise in national self-defense, and given that, Article II of the Constitution, 
not international law, provided ample authority for the President to institute the 
blockade. 
Here, it is critical to disentangle the question of the President’s authority to 
act under the Constitution from the legality of his action challenged by the 
claimants under international law.  On the former question, the Court was 
clear: 
The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power.  He is 
bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.  He is Commander-in-
chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the 
several States when called into the actual service of the United States.  He has 
no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a 
domestic State.  But . . . [i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the 
President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.  He does not 
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any 
special legislative authority.  And whether the hostile party be a foreign 
invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war . . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief, 
in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and 
a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them 
the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court 
must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the 
Government to which this power was entrusted.26 
Professor Lee makes an interesting argument that Lincoln’s blockade in some 
respects was more properly viewed as offensive as a matter of international 
law.27  But that is not how the Court saw it as a matter of constitutional law. 
 
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by 
the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 179 (2004). 
 26. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668–70 (1863); see also LOUIS FISHER, 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6–8 (1995) (recounting acceptance at the constitutional convention 
of the Executive’s power “to repel sudden attacks”). 
 27. Lee, supra note 1, at 62–64. 
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In contrast, the international law of war, and the laws of prize and capture, 
were relevant inasmuch as they answered the separate questions presented by 
the claimants—whether a state of war existed sufficient to justify the 
imposition of a blockade, and whether the ships seized were appropriately 
deemed “enemy” ships, subject to capture.28  In this regard, perhaps the most 
noteworthy aspect of the Court’s holding is its decision that even the Amy 
Warwick (a vessel owned by Virginians who asserted U.S. citizenship) was 
properly deemed enemy property.29  But the significance here is almost 
certainly far greater as a political matter than a legal one.  By the time the Amy 
Warwick was captured, Virginia had seceded from the Union;30 seven states 
had ratified the Constitution of Confederate States, providing for the formation 
of a “permanent federal government” and establishing that each state enjoyed 
“sovereign and independent character”;31 and Confederate forces had attacked 
the federal Fort Sumter.32  It was a dramatic moment in U.S. history for the 
Supreme Court to recognize, in effect, that “[e]ach party is therefore deemed 
by us a belligerent nation, having, so far as concerns us, the sovereign rights of 
war.”33  But concluding that an attacking foreign sovereign state was an 
“enemy” likely required little stretch under international law. 
II.  JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
If the Prize Cases are of less-than-blockbuster import on the question of 
presidential power under international law, what of their significance for the 
role of the judiciary on questions of law in wartime?  Professor Lee argues that 
the Court’s posture in the Prize Cases is one of substantial deference to the 
Executive, on questions of both law and fact.34  Citing the end of the passage 
excerpted above on the scope of executive power under the Constitution, 
Professor Lee suggests that the Court accepted at face value the President’s 
 
 28. As the Court explains near the outset: 
The right of prize and capture has its origin in the ‘jus belli,’ and is governed and 
adjudged under the law of nations.  To legitimate the capture of a neutral vessel or 
property on the high seas, a war must exist de facto, and the neutral must have a 
knowledge or notice of the intention of one of the parties belligerent to use this mode of 
coercion . . . . 
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666. 
 29. See id. at 637, 674–75. 
 30. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 280 
(1988) (explaining that Virginia officially seceded on May 23, 1861, before the July 10, 1861 
capture of the Amy Warwick). 
 31. CONFED. CONST. pmbl., reprinted in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE PROVISIONAL 
GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 11 (James M. Matthews ed., 
Richmond, R.M. Smith Printer to Congress 1864). 
 32. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 637, 669. 
 33. Id. at 669 (quoting The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 337 (1822)). 
 34. Lee, supra note 1, at 68–70. 
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judgment that the conflict with the South amounted to war.35  Likewise, the 
Court could have—but did not—review de novo the facts of the individual 
ships’ capture in applying international law to each of the consolidated cases 
before the Court.36  The Court’s behavior in both respects, Professor Lee’s 
characterization suggests, makes it unsurprising that the Prize Cases continue 
to be invoked by Executives seeking to assert broad discretion over security 
affairs. 
Yet while one might find “language of” deference lurking in passing dicta, 
the Prize Cases Court devotes the vast bulk of its opinion to conducting a 
remarkably detailed, de novo review on questions of law and fact.  Consider 
first the legal significance of the Court’s statement, quoted in separate part 
above: 
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief, in 
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and a 
civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them 
the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court 
must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the 
Government to which this power was entrusted.  ‘He must determine what 
degree of force the crisis demands.’37 
While there may be some debate about precisely what “question” the Court 
means is governed by the Executive’s “decisions and acts,” the paragraphs 
both preceding and following this passage make it difficult to conclude that the 
Court was referring to the operative legal question in the case of whether or not 
a state of war exists.  Indeed, the opinion had just finished explaining that as a 
matter of international law, “a civil war is never publicly proclaimed,” but 
rather, “its actual existence is a fact in our domestic history which the Court is 
bound to notice and to know.”38  It had also just explained how, as a matter of 
constitutional law, “no name given” to the war then raging between the states 
by either the President or Congress “could change the fact” that from the 
Court’s point of view and that of “all the world,” war plainly exists.39 
If anything, the subject of judicial deference in the passage reproduced 
above was not the President’s determination of the legal status of war, but 
 
 35. Id. at 68–69 (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670 (“Whether the President in fulfilling his 
duties, as Commander-in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile 
resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the 
character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by 
the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was 
entrusted.”)). 
 36. See id. at 69–70. 
 37. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670; see also FISHER, supra note 26, at 6–8 (recounting 
acceptance at the constitutional convention of the Executive’s power “to repel sudden attacks”). 
 38. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 667. 
 39. Id. at 669. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] CONTEMPORARY LESSONS FROM THE AGE-OLD PRIZE CASES 81 
rather, given the existence of war, the nature and quantum of force appropriate 
in response (as noted in the passage’s concluding sentence, “He must 
determine what degree of force the crisis demands.”).  No doubt, there is some 
significance in the questionable suggestion, if this were the Court’s intent, that 
the President is entitled to complete discretion on the matter of what degree of 
force is appropriate in self-defense.  But in light of the many paragraphs 
beyond this one the Court devotes to establishing that war exists no matter 
what the parties themselves say, it is difficult at best to read this passage as 
having much if any bearing on the merits of the legal question presented in the 
cases. 
What, then, of the Court’s treatment of the facts—in particular the 
application of international law of prize and capture to the varied 
circumstances of each individual claimant’s case—in which Professor Lee 
finds evidence of “exceeding” deference to the President?40  His principle 
complaint, however, is the Court’s treatment of the question of law underlying 
those claims, namely, the Court’s holding that because residents of seceded 
states had “cast off their allegiance and made war on their Government,” they 
and their property may be properly treated as “enemy,” subject to confiscation 
under the law of war.41  One might disagree with the merits of the Court’s 
conclusion on this point, but as I suggested above, there is little evidence to 
suggest the Court reached it solely (or at all) as a result of a sense of deference 
due the President’s interpretation.  As Justice Grier, writing for the majority, 
puts it perhaps most directly: “[Claimants] cannot ask a Court to affect a 
technical ignorance of the existence of a war, which all the world 
acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in the history of the human 
race.”42 
Professor Lee also finds evidence of deference in what he views as the 
Court’s insufficiently careful attention to each of the claimants’ factual 
arguments about the legality of their particular capture43 (for example, whether 
a crew had fair notice of the blockade).  But again here, while there may be 
some disagreement about the merits of the Court’s judgment in each instance, 
it is hard to read the nearly ten pages the Court devotes to discussing such 
features of the record as deposition testimony regarding a vessel’s particular 
route through Lake Ponchartrain as indicating any degree of deference to 
(unmentioned) factual findings of the Executive.44  In all events, the factual 
judgments the Court reviews in this regard are those not of the Executive, but 
rather of proceedings conducted by the lower courts.  But for the unusual 
 
 40. Lee, supra note 1, at 69. 
 41. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 674. 
 42. Id. at 669. 
 43. See Lee, supra note 1, at 69–70. 
 44. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 674–83. 
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nature of the Supreme Court’s role in these cases as prize court of last resort, 
the level of attention the Court pays to the factual record here would seem 
extraordinary indeed. 
Consider finally the Prize Cases Court’s ready rejection of the Executive’s 
vigorous arguments in favor of judicial abstention.  As Professor Lee points 
out, the Court’s review of the cases came over substantial objections by the 
President’s counsel that the Court abstain under the circumstances.45  Yet the 
Court devotes not even a portion of its opinion to discussing questions of 
justiciability or the like.  Quite the contrary, Justice Grier concludes by 
emphasizing: “We have shown that a civil war such as that now waged 
between the Northern and Southern States is properly conducted according to 
the humane regulations of public law as regards capture on the ocean.”46  Even 
in the midst of the “greatest civil war known in the history of the human race,” 
this was a Court entirely comfortable with the notion that certain disputes 
would be settled by law. 
CONCLUSION 
When held up against the most recent judicial forays into the field of 
foreign affairs, the lesson of the Prize Cases seems quite consistent with the 
Court’s modern sensibility: “[A] case that may be of extraordinary importance 
is resolved by ordinary rules.”47  As in the Prize Cases, the Executive 
advanced similarly vigorous arguments against Court review in Boumediene, 
Hamdan, Hamdi, and Rasul,48 and was likewise met with responses ranging 
from indifference to categorical rejection.  Disposing of the Government’s 
argument in Hamdan that the Court should abstain from deciding the legality 
of military commission trials until after their conclusion, the Court held that 
neither the existence of the commission process itself nor any “other 
‘important countervailing interest’” enabled “federal courts to depart from their 
general ‘duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by 
Congress.’”49  In Boumediene, where the Court recognized a constitutional 
 
 45. Lee, supra note 1, at 68 (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 645–46) (“And this attention 
came despite strong arguments by the President’s counsel for judicial abstention (including, 
apparently, the suggestion that deciding the merits would make the Court an ‘ally of the 
enemy’).”). 
 46. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 673. 
 47. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 48. Brief for the Respondents at 66–67, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2229 
(2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196); Brief for Respondents at 24–25, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 
05-184); Brief for the Respondents at 25–27, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-
6696); Brief for the Respondents at 35–36, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-
343). 
 49. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 589 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 
(1996)). 
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right of certain military detainees to habeas corpus, the Court’s interest in 
ongoing engagement with such questions in the future was even more direct: 
“Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited duration, it 
has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined.  If, as 
some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to 
come, the Court might not have this luxury.”50 
None of this is to say that the Supreme Court never has—or never 
should—decline to address questions of executive foreign affairs power during 
times of conflict.  But together with the contemporaneous Civil War examples 
of active court engagement in matters of military detention in Ex parte 
Milligan51 and Ex parte Merryman,52 and the findings of Professor Sloss 
elsewhere in this volume suggesting judicial review was more the norm than 
the exception in early America,53 it seems increasingly difficult to maintain, as 
Professor Lee puts it, that “the Court has historically seemed a timid 
institution” in wartime.54 
 
 50. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277. 
 51. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 52. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).  Merryman was decided by Chief Justice 
Taney while sitting with the Circuit Court of the District of Maryland.  Id. at 147. 
 53. See David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
145 (2008). 
 54. Lee, supra note 1, at 71. 
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